Protecting the Privacy of the Absent Patient: Rudnick v. Superior Court by Tarr, Ralph W.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1975
Protecting the Privacy of the Absent Patient:
Rudnick v. Superior Court
Ralph W. Tarr
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ralph W. Tarr, Protecting the Privacy of the Absent Patient: Rudnick v. Superior Court, 27 Hastings L.J. 99 (1975).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol27/iss1/3
PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF THE ABSENT
PATIENT: RUDNICK v SUPERIOR COURT
The physician-patient privilege has been criticized for being a
device which allows the "suppression of useful truth."' In response,
Califorma has narrowly limited the privilege by grafting onto it a series
of exceptions. One of the purposes which the privilege still serves,
however, is the protection of the privacy of a patient who is not a party
to a civil proceeding. 2 A recent California Supreme Court case, Rudnick
v Superior Court,' concerned the effectiveness of the privilege statute m
accomplishing tins purpose. Broadly construing the physician-patient
privilege, the court held that when the disclosure of a patient's medical
information to a third party is reasonably necessary to the patients
treatment, the third party may assert the privilege on behalf of the
absent patient, whether or not the patient has consented to the disclo-
sure. The opinon in Rudnick unfortunately provided little insight into
the meaning of the statutory language, "reasonably necessary."'4 Empha-
sizing the protection of patient privacy, this note will examine the
Rudnick decision and its applicability to the rapidly proliferating num-
ber and variety of third parties who are privy to confidential medical
information. A history of the privilege at both national and state levels
will be followed by the argument that for privacy to be efficaciously
protected, the Rudnick ruling should be extended beyond mere authori-
zation to include the imposition of a duty upon the third party to assert,
and the court to recognize, the privilege on behalf of the absent patient.
The final section evaluates the "reasonable necessity" of various third
parties who receive confidential medical information.
History
Since 1851, California has recognized the confidentiality of the
physician-patient relationship by statutorily providing that information
arising from this relationship be privileged from disclosure in civil
1. 8 J.H. WiGMOREm, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 2380a, at 831 (J.
McNaghton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WioMoRn]; see text accompanying notes
61-67, infra.
2. 1974 CAL. L. REV. CO XWN ANN. REP. I.
3. 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
4. CA. EviD. CODE § 912(d) (West 1966).
matters. 5 Such a physician-patient privilege was not recognized at com-
mon law,6 and its first statutory appearance in America was in New
York's 1828 Field Code.7 California's statute, patterned after the New
York provision, guarded "against the possibility of [the patient's] feel-
ings being shocked or his reputation tarnished by . . . subsequent
disclosure [of his medical condition].""
The early California position, expressed in former Code of Civil
Procedure section 1881(4), was arguably adequate to protect the priva-
cy of the patient's communications to his physician, given the nature of
the physician-patient relationship and the standard practice of medicine
at the time. During that period, California had a basically rural society
which allowed a very personal relationship to develop between the
patient and his physician. The physician was more than merely a healer
of physical illness. He was a family friend, attending to a wide range of
problems and often receiving payment in kind or none at all. In those
times the physician was truly a general practitioner.
The nature of this relationship has radically changed since 1851.1
5. "A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient,
be examined as a witness, as to any information acquired in attending the patient, which
was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient." Cal. Stat. 1851, ch. 5,
§ 398 at 114 (codified at CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1881 (West 1966) (repealed 1966,
West Supp. 1975) ). The former privilege statute will be referred to as section 1881.
Section 1881 also contained the marital, lawyer-client, clergyman-penitent, government,
and reporter privileges. The physician-patient privilege is now codified in CAL EvED.
CODE H§ 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975).
6. "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he would be
guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give that information in
a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed
to him as any indiscretion whatever." 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2380, at 818, quot-
ing The Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Trials 355, 573 (1776) (Mansfield
L.C.J.); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 98, at 212 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]. England still follows this case, as do most of the British Common-
wealth countries. 26 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1959) Medicine and Phar-
macy 11. Most European countries, however, have long recognized the privilege. "Un-
der the Civil Law, communications between a physician and his patient were at all times
considered confidential and sacred. Without the consent of the patient, the physician
could not disclose at any time, either in court or elsewhere, any information regarding
the health or physical condition of the patient which he acquired in his professional
capacity. Today, in most European countries, the relationship of physician and patient
is completely protected by a cloak of privilege." C. DEWrrr, PRIVILEGED COMMUmICA-
TIONS BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 9 n.1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DEWrrr].
7. "No person authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed to dis-
close any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a profes-
sional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for
such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon." MCCORMICK, su-
pra note 6, § 98 at 212 n.3, quoting N.Y. Rev. Stat. tit. 3 § 73 (1829).
8. In re Estate of Flint, 100 Cal. 391, 397, 34 P. 863, 864 (1893).
9. California Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice, Preliminary
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The once personal relationship between physician and patient has yield-
ed to the inclusion of numerous third parties in the normal course of
treatment. Rapid urbanization and population growth have dramatically
increased the physician's workload and thus the physician is required to
keep a greater volume of records and to employ various medical and
non-medical personnel to assist him in that task. Further, with increased
specialization in the medical field it has become necessary more fre-
quently for the general practitioner to refer patients to specialists. Simi-
larly, the advent of computers and other data analyzing and storage
systems has resulted in increases in the amount and availability of
information to greater numbers of medical and non-medical personnel.10
Another factor in this expansion of persons involved in the normal
course of treating a patient has been the extensive government regula-
tion of drugs. In many cases a patient (or his physician) must commu-
nicate the patient's medical information to a licensed pharmacist to
acquire needed medication."' Government agencies have also become
actively involved in protecting the public against the effects of certain
medical conditions and to that end require physicians to report the
incidence of communicable diseases or illnesses which might result in a
patient's unexpected loss of consciousness. Finally, the skyrocketing cost
of medical care requires that all but a very few in this country purchase
some form of medical insurance to meet those costs, and recovery under
a policy necessitates that the physician transmit the patient's medical
information to the insurance company.
As this proliferation of third parties12 privy to confidential data
acquired in the context of the physician-patient relationship began to
gain momentum, an increasing amount of information lost the protec-
tion of the confidentiality provision.' s This problem arose because form-
Report on Medical Malpractice, at 21-24 (June, 1974), discussing the changing physi-
cian-patient relationship as a factor in the rapid increase in medical malpractice suits.
10. See Hermann, Impact of Computers on Medical Malpractice, A.B.A.J. SECr.
oN INS., NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATON L., 278 (1969), for a discussion of computer
diagnosis of patients, which requires placing vast amounts of the patient's background
information in the computer, thus making the patient's medical history available to a
broader section of the medical profession and even to non-professionals at each com-
puter terminal.
11. The prescribed drug itself indicates at least a range of possible infirmities, and
often permits the pharmacist to conclude with relative certainty the specific illness from
which the patient suffers. On some occasions the pharmacist receives the patient's med-
ical information in the course of verifying that the physician indeed meant what he ap-
parently wrote.
12. One medical publication has called this the "Age of the Third Party." Insur-
ance Data Bank Attacked As Abuse of Confidentiality, 7 HosPrrAL PRAcrcE, Aug.
1972, at 47.
13. The California Medical Association described the situation in this way:
"However, in recent years-with the increase of third-party financing mechanisms, coin-
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er section 1881(4) spoke only in terms of the "physician or surgeon' 4
and did not include nurses, interns, pharmacists and other third parties
who received the patient's medical information in the normal course of
treatment. Although the courts in California liberally construed the
physician-patient privilege in favor of the patient as to the scope of the
communications covered,' 5 they strictly construed section 1881(4) as to
the persons who came within its provisions.'6 Green v. Superior Court'7
was the leading case on this point. In Green, the husband in a divorce
action involving child custody subpoenaed several pharmacists from
whom the wife had purchased her prescription drugs. The pharmacists
appeared without their records and refused to testify concerning the
nature and strength of the drugs they had dispensed to the wife. When
they were found guilty of contempt, the pharmacists sought review of
the order. The court of appeal affirmed the contempt order, holding that
the pharmacists were not authorized by section 1881(4) to assert the
physician-patient privilege on behalf of their customers. 1
8
In 1965 the California legislature responded to the societal trend
toward a greater number and variety of third persons in the physician-
patient relationship in the process of repealing section 1881 and replac-
ing it with an entire chapter of the Evidence Code which sets out the
various privileges in much greater detail.' 9 The current physician-patient
puterized data banks and the immense amount of detailed information requested by gov-
ernment, insurance companies and employers--confidentiality of patient-physician com-
munications and patient medical records has been endangered." 119 CALIFORNIA MEDI-
cnri, Dec. 1973, at 45.
14. See note 5, supra.
15. See, e.g., Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 177, 303 P.2d 839, 847
(1956); Turner v. Redwood Mut. Life Ass'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 573, 576, 57 P.2d 222,
223 (1936). The majority rule in the United States is apparently to the contrary. See,
Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy, 1970
L. & Soc. ORDER 191, 193; 49 TExAs L. REv. 929, 930-31 (1971).
16. Frederick v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 585, 57 P.2d 235 (1936)
(interns in a hospital not included). See Kramer v. Policy Holders Life Ins. Ass'n, 5
Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d 665 (1935) (stenographer-nurse not included); DEWrrr, su-
pra note 6, at 69.
17. 220 Cal. App. 2d 121, 33 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1963).
18. There was an alternative reason in this case for the pharmacists being refused
permission to assert the privilege. The wife had placed her fitness to care for the chil-
dren in issue and therefore the "patient-litigant" exception to the privilege applied, elim-
inating her physician-patient privilege as to this issue. (This exception was included
in former section 1881(4) and is now codified at CAL. EvID. CODE § 996 (West 1966).
As a result, even if the court had found that the pharmacists were authorized to assert
the privilege, there would have been no privilege to assert in Green.
19. Cal. Stat. 1965, ch. 299, § 4 at 1325 (codified at CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 950-
62 (lawyer-client), 980-87 (confidential marital communications), 990-1007 (physician-
patient), 1010-1026 (psychotherapist-patient), 1030-1034 (clergyman-penitent) (West
1966 & Supp. 1975) ).
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privilege statute, as contained in Evidence Code sections 990 through
1007, defines "confidential communication" to include information giv-
en to third parties in the normal course of treatment.2 0 Thus, as long as
information was generated by the physician-patient relationship,21 the
fact that it was acquired by certain third parties does not prevent the
protection of the patient's privacy.
Rudnick v. Superior Court
Despite this statutory clarification, the precise boundaries of the-
newly expanded privilege remain undefined. Some circumstances,
though, are clearly either appropriate or inappropriate for application of
the privilege. For example, if the patient is the plaintiff and has placed
his health in issue, the physician-patient privilege does not apply.22 If,
on the other hand, the patient is the defendant and the plaintiff has
attempted to place the defendant's health in issue, the privilege may be
asserted.28 In this case the defendant can refuse to testify concerning
confidential matters and can prevent either his doctor or a third party
from doing so. 2 4 There is a third possibility, however. In this situation
the patient is not a party to the suit, is even perhaps unaware that the
suit is pending, and a party to the suit attempts to discover or introduce
into evidence confidential communications between the patient and his
20. "As used in this article, 'confidential communication between patient and phy-
sician' means information, including information obtained by an examination of the pa-
tient, transmitted between a patient and his physician in the course of that relationship
and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the infor-
mation to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of
the patient in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
physician is consulted, and includes a diagnosis made and the advice given by the physi-
cian in the course of that relationship." CAL. EviD. CODE § 992 (West Supp. 1975).
21. This relationship exists only when a person "consults a physician or submits
to the examination by a physician for the purpose of securing a diagnosis or preventive,
palliative, or curative treatment of his physical or mental or emotional condition." CAL.
Evm. CoDE § 991 (West 1966).
22. CAL. EviD. CODE § 996 (West 1966). This exception is referred to as the
"patient-litigant" exception.
23. Carlton v. Superior Ct., 261 Cal. App. 2d 282, 290, 67 Cal. Rptr. 568, 573
(1968).
24. "Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, the
patient, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent an-
other from disclosing, a confidential communication between the patient and physician
if the privilege is claimed by: (a) The holder of the privilege; (b) A person who is
authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege; or (c) The person who
was the physician at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may
not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if he is other-
wise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure." CAL. Evm. CODE § 994
(West 1966 & Stpp. 1975).
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physician which were passed in the normal course of treatment to a third
person who is a party to the action. It is unclear what safeguards exist
for the privacy2 of the patient when this confidential information is
threatened with public revelation in a civil action2" in which the patient
25. The possibility of the interposition of various constitutional arguments follow-
ing the authority of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), to the effect that
the physician-patient privilege is in a "zone of privacy" and thus is a part of the consti-
tutional right of privacy found by Justice Douglas within the so-called "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights, is beyond the scope of this note. Suffice it to say that the California
Supreme Court recognized the possibility of such an argument in dicta in In re Lif-
schutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-432, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970): "We
believe that a patient's interest in keeping such confidential revelations [to a psychother-
apist] from public purview, in retaining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots than
the California statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court declared that '[v]arious guaran-
tees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy', and we believe that the confiden-
tiality of the psychotherapeutic session falls within one such zone. Although Griswold
itself involved only the marital relationship, the open-ended quality of that decision's
rationale evidences its far-reaching dimension." (citations omitted) Nevertheless, the
court in Lifschutz expressed some doubt as to whether this language could be analogized
to the physician-patient privilege. Id. at 434 n.20, 467 P.2d at 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at
842. For further discussion of Lifschutz, see Louisell & Sinclair, Forward: Reflections
on the Law of Privileged Communications-The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in
Perspective, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Louisell & Sinclair]; 3
CONN. L. REV. 599 (1971); 49 TEXAS L. REV. 929 (1971). Further, California in 1972
added a right of privacy to its constitution: "All people are by nature free and inde-
pendent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and
defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (West Supp.
1975). A discussion of the amendment's ramifications is also beyond the scope of this
article.
26. The physician is under both an ethical and a legal duty not to disclose pro-
fessional confidences outside of the courtroom. The Hippocratic Oath contains the fol-
lowing pledge: "All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession
or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be
spread abroad I will keep secret and will never reveal." The AMA "Principles
of Medical Ethics" contains a similar statement: "A physician may not reveal
the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical attendance, or the de-
ficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he is required to
do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the
individual or of the community." In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 429 n.9, 467 P.2d
557, 565-66, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 837-38 (1970), quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCA-
TION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 9. In addition, the California Business and
Professions Code imposes a legal duty on the physician to guarantee the privacy of the
patient outside the courtroom: "The willful betraying of a professional secret constitutes
unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this chapter." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2379 (West Supp. 1975). Unprofessional conduct is punishable by loss of license.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §9 2360, 2361 (West Supp. 1975). On the other hand, the
California Supreme Court recently held that under certain circumstances a doctor or
psychotherapist is under both an ethical and a legal duty to disclose such confidential
matter. Citing the ethical standard articulated in section 9 of the AMA "Principles of
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
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is not a party.27 This note will discuss whether the third party has the
authority to assert the privilege on the patient's behalf, and further,
whether the third party has a duty to do so.
The first issue was faced directly in Rudnick v. Superior Court.28
Plaintiff and petitioner, Jacqueline Rudnick, brought a products liability
action against Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. and the Stuart Company.
She sought $350,000 for damages allegedly resulting from her ingestion
of the drug Dialose Plus at her doctor's direction and according to
defendant manufacturer's instructions for proper use. Plaintiff alleged
that the drug contained oxyphenisatin acetate, which induced symptoms
of jaundice and hepatitis requiring medical treatment including hospital-
ization.
During discovery, plaintiff properly served defendant's custodian of
records with a subpoena duces tecum in an attempt to depose 29 the
custodian and examine all records relating to adverse reactions caused by
the drug. At the deposition in Wilmington, Delaware, the custodian of
records refused to produce the adverse reaction reports"0 on the ground
that they constituted confidential information and that the defendants
had no right to waive the physician-patient privilege protecting the
records from disclosure. Thereupon plaintiff moved for an order com-
pelling defendants to produce some fifty drug reaction reports. The trial
court granted this motion but limited the information required by its
order to the names and addresses of the doctors submitting the reports.
Plaintiff then sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to
compel defendants to produce the reports. When the court of appeal
Medical Ethics," supra, the court stated: "When a doctor or a psychotherapist, in the
exercise of his professional skill and knowledge, determines, or should determine, that
a warning is essential to avert danger arising from the medical or psychological condi-
tion of his patient, he incurs a legal obligation to give that warning." Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Calif., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 183, 529 P.2d 553, 555, 118 Cal. Rptr.
129, 131 (1974), reh. granted, Mar. 12, 1975. In Tarasoff the court held that a cause
of action existed against a psychotherapist for failure to warn the patient's girlfriend
that the patient had threatened to kill her. Two months after the statement to the psy-
chotherapist the patient indeed murdered the young woman and her parents sued the
therapist for wrongful death. The court concluded that "[t]he protective privilege ends
where the public peril begins." 13 Cal. 3d at 191, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
27. CAL. EvlD. CODE § 994 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975) specifically states that the
privilege is valid and in force regardless of whether or not the patient is a party to the
action.
28. 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
29. "Mhe deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged ...
All matters which are privileged against disclosure upon the trial under the law of this
state are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure." CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 2016(b) (West Supp. 1975).
30. These reports are forwarded to the drug companies by physicians who have
prescribed the drug to patients who subsequently developed adverse reactions.
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denied the plaintiffs application for a writ,3 the California Supreme
Court granted a hearing and issued an alternative writ, 2 in order to
consider the novel question "whether a third party recipient of confiden-
tial information from a physician may assert the physician-patient privi-
lege."
33
Before the high court, petitioner first argued that since the reports
were not "actual medical files"3 4 they were not confidential and were
thus discoverable. 5 The petitioner next argued that if the reports were
confidential, the physician-patient privilege had been waived when the
physicians forwarded the reports to the drug companies. Should this
argument also fail, plaintiff alleged further that the drug company did
31. In a memorandum opinion the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate
District, stated: "The petition for writ of mandate is denied without prejudice to a fur-
ther showing, if the petitioner is so advised, that the individual patients who are the
subject of the requested medical reports waived the physician-patient privilege. (Marcus
v. Superior Court, Henard v. Superior Court.)" (citations omitted) 5 Civil No. 2189
(Cal. Ct. App. Fifth App. Dist. Jan. 11, 1974).
In Marcus v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1971), a medi-
cal malpractice action was brought alleging negligence in administering an angiogram
to plaintiff. The trial court granted a motion to quash plaintiff's subpoena of the doctor
and hospital for medical records of their patients who had been given the same test by
the doctor in the hospital. At the same time, the trial court issued an order compelling
defendants to produce the names and addresses of the patients. The court of appeal
issued a writ of prohibition at the request of defendants against enforcement of the trial
court's order because revealing the names and addresses would reveal information pro-
tected by the physician-patient privilege-that is, confidential information about the ail-
ments of the named patients.
In Henard v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 129, 102 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1972), the
plaintiff brought a products liability action and sought from defendant drug company
its adverse reaction reports concerning the drug in question; defendant delivered them
to the plaintiff, but the reports contained only the initials of the reporting doctors.
Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to compel disclosure of the
doctors' names. The court of appeal issued the writ on the bases that only the patients'
identities, not the doctors', needed to be protected, and that the various doctors could
assert the physician-patient privilege to protect their patients during subsequent individ-
ual depositions.
32. 11 Cal. 3d at 928, 523 P.2d at 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 607. The court affirmed
that "the writ of mandate is a proper remedy for reviewing discovery procedures," stat-
ing that "[w]e were impelled to issue the alternative writ in this case because we are
presented with a question of first impression which is of general importance to the trial
courts and to the profession, and in conjunction with which general guidelines can be
laid down for future cases." (citations omitted) The question of first impression is set
out in the text.
33. 11 Cal. 3d at 928, 523 P.2d at 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
34. Petitioner relied on Marcus v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 95 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1971). Petition for Hearing at 3, Rudnick v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523
P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
35. Petitioner cited Henard v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 129, 102 Cal. Rptr.
721 (1972). Petition for Writ of Mandate at 9-10; Petition for Hearing at 3, Rudnick
v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
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not have standing to assert the privilege, as it was not a "holder of the
privilege" within the meaning of Evidence Code section 994.36 Finally,
petitioner asserted that her only alternative, should the trial court's order
stand, would be to travel all over the country deposing the fifty doctors
who had submitted the reports. Plaintiff claimed that this situation
"would impose a severe, and in many cases, a prohibitive financial
burden on the plaintiff' as she conducted necessary discovery because
each of the doctors would pose the physician-patient privilege, requiring
the plaintiff to engage in further litigation to compel discovery. Without
these individual depositions, the reasoning continued, plaintiff's burden
of demonstrating that each patient had waived the privilege, as the court
of appeal required, would be insurmountable, as she did not even have
the names of the patients. On the other hand, plaintiff argued, access to
the reports would lower the cost of discovery by allowing her to select
doctors whose depositions would be valuable to her case.
Defendant drug companies responded to plaintiffs first argument,
that only "actual medical files" are confidential, by contending that even
the revelation of the names and addresses of the patients would consti-
tute communication of the confidential information protected by the
privilege; thus, the companies insisted, the adverse reaction reports had
to be held confidential. Second, citing Evidence Code section 912(d)1
7
and arguing that the adverse reaction reports were "reasonably neces-
sary" for the proper treatment of the patients involved, defendants
denied that there had been a waiver of the physician-patient privilege
when the doctors forwarded the reports to the companies. The reasoning
behind this argument was that an adverse reaction report enables a
company to determine whether or not there is a cause and effect
relationship between use of the drug and the symptoms exhibited by the
patient following use. When that question has been determined and
communicated to the doctor, the doctor may proceed properly to treat
the patient. Defendants argued further that even if the reports were not
"reasonably necessary" to the treatment of the patient, there was no
waiver because only the holder of the privilege38 can waive it, 9 and
36. Petition for Writ of Mandate, Rudnick v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523
P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
37. "A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privi-
lege provided by Section ...994 (physician-patient privilege), when such disclosure
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the. . physi-
cian . was consulted is not a waiver of the privilege." CAL. Evw. CODE § 912(d)
(West 1966). See Return to Alternate Writ of Mandamus at 7-10, Rudnick v. Superior
Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
38. "As used in this article, 'holder of the privilege' means: (a) The patient when
he has no guardian or conservator. (b) A guardian or conservator of the patient when
the patient has a guardian or conservator. (c) The personal representative of the pa-
tient if the patient is dead." CAL. Evm. CODE § 993 (West 1966).
39. CAL. Evm. CODE § 912(a) (West 1966).
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there was no evidence that the patients had expressly waived the privi-
lege by authorizing release of the information to the drug companies. To
petitioner's third point, defendants responded that under section 994 of
the Evidence Code they were parties "to whom disclosure [had been]
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the physician [had been]
consulted,"40 and that therefore they had standing to assert the privilege
on behalf of the patients. Fourth, the companies responded to plaintiff's
allegation of excessive burden by asserting that defendant's abstracts of
the fifty reports had provided plaintiff with all the information necessary
for her action, including data on age, sex, race, and geographical area of
residence of each patient, a generalized summary of the patient's symp-
toms and the doctor's opinion regarding how the drug caused or contrib-
uted to the patient's symptoms. Defendants argued that if the plaintiff
needed more information, she could seek it during depositions of the
doctors, at which time the doctors could consult their patients as to
whether the patients wished to waive the privilege. Finally, they submit-
ted that if the writ were granted, physicians, fearing civil liability for
disclosure, would be discouraged from sending reaction reports.4 ' This
result would be contrary to public policy in that such reports assist in the
continual evaluation of drugs and have in the past led to the withdrawal
of harmful drugs from the market, the replacement of deleterious ingre-
dients, and the dissemination of augmented warnings to both physician
and patient concerning possible adverse reations.
Thus, the court was faced with four different public policy argu-
ments. Arguments for denial were (a) the protection of the privacy of
patients who are not involved in the suit; (b) the maintenance of the
confidential relationship between physician and patient; and (c) the
reception by drug companies of feedback on the quality of their drugs.
The argument in favor of the writ was the protection of a plaintiffs
interest in discovery of all relevant matter necessary to the successful
conduct of an action.
In deciding the issue, the supreme court held that:
a disclosure in confidence by a physician, with or without the con-
40. CAL. EVID. CODE § 992 (West Supp. 1975).
41. The Food and Drug Administration does not require physicians to make ad-
verse reaction reports concerning drugs already approved and licensed for marketing.
With respect to "Investigative New Drugs," though, before a physician receives permis-
sion to participate in the limited use of the drug he must agree to submit reports of
all adverse reactions. 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (Form FD-1572, para. 6) (1974). Drug com-
panies, on the other hand, are under an obligation to report periodically the efficacy
and side effect of their drugs to the FDA. 21 C.F.R. § 310.301 (1974). Any company
which fails adequately to investigate its drugs or fully to report the nature and extent
of the adverse effects they produce is liable to criminal prosecution. Compare 21
U.S.C. § 331(e) (1970) with 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
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sent of the patient, of communications protected by the physician-
patient privilege to a third party to whom disclosure is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
physician is consulted confers upon the third person the right to
claim the physician-patient privilege on behalf of the patient. In
other words, that third person thereby becomes "[a] person who
is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege"
within the meaning of section 994.42
The court then issued a peremptory writ vacating the order below and
directing the trial court to reconsider its decision to allow plaintiff to
discover the names and addresses of the doctors.
In arriving at this holding, the court concluded as to petitioner's
first argument, lack of confidentiality, that because the communication
was originally made in confidence by a patient to his physician it
"remains a confidential communication subject to privilege unless the
privilege is waived by the patient as provided in section 912."43 Thus,
whether or not there is a confidential communication as defined by
section 992 "is determined at the time the information is communicated
to or ascertained by the physician.""
In response to petitioner's waiver and lack of standing arguments,
the court enunciated guidelines for deciding whether or not there had
been a waiver of the privilege and whether or not the companies were
authorized to assert the privilege on behalf of the patients. First, the
court looked to Evidence Code section 994, which specifies who may
claim the privilege. It concluded that since the defendant companies
were neither the holders of the privilege (as defined in Evidence Code
section 993) nor the physicians who received the communications, they
would have to demonstrate that they were "persons authorized to
[assert the privilege] by the patient[s]." 4" Since there was no indication
in the record that the patients had expressly authorized the defendants to
assert the privilege on their behalf, the court considered whether or not
authorization could be implied as a matter of law.46 Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Sullivan relied on Evidence Code section
912(d), which states that there is no waiver when disclosure to a third
party is "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the . . .physician . . . was consulted." Extrapolating from this
language, Justice Sullivan concluded that there had been a constructive
authorization of the third parties to assert the privilege in the patients'
behalf. 47 The reasoning here requires a major judicial inference because
42. 11 Cal. 3d at 932, 523 P.2d at 649-50, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 609-10.
43. Id. at 930, 523 P.2d at 648, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 929, 523 P.2d at 648, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 932, 523 P.2d at 649, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
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the statutes do not explicitly state that the absence of a waiver will
constitute an authorization to assert the privilege.
The earlier case of Kramer v. Policy Holders Life Insurance Asso-
ciation,48 decided under the old statute, cast doubt upon such a connec-
tion between waiver and persons who may claim the privilege. In Kramer
the physician had a stenographer-office nurse present when he examined
the patient. The question was whether the doctor could assert the privi-
lege or whether the privilege had been waived because the disclosure had
been made in the presence of the third party. The court held that there
had been no waiver and stated that it was not necessary to decide
whether the stenographer could also claim the privilege. 49 Nonetheless
the court in Kramer referred to a series of decisions in other jurisdictions
holding that there was no waiver when the presence of the third party
was apparently necessary, and that the doctor could assert the privilege
but the third party could not.50
Justice Sullivan's inference that absence of a waiver constitutes a
constructive authorization of the third party to assert the privilege is
consistent, however, with the expressed intent of the legislature:
Subdivision (d) [section 9121 may change California law.
Green v. Superior Court held that the physician-patient privilege
did not provide protection against disclosure by a pharmacist of in-
formation concerning the nature of drugs dispensed upon prescrip-
tion."1
48. 5 Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d 665 (1935).
49. Id. at 386, 42 P.2d at 672.
50. Id. at 393-95, 42 P.2d 670-72; see also Cross, Privileged Communications Be-
tween Participants in Group Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 191, 193-94.
51. CAL. Evm. CODE § 912, Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966) (cita-
tion omitted). The portion preceding that quoted in the text reads as follows: "Subdi-
vision (d) is designed to maintain the confidentiality of communications in certain situa-
tions where the communications are disclosed to others in the course of accomplishing
the purpose for which the lawyer, physician, or psychotherapist was consulted. For ex-
ample, where a confidential communication from a client is related by his attorney to
a physician, appraiser, or other expert in order to obtain that person's assistance so that
the attorney will better be able to advise his client, the disclosure is not a waiver of
the privilege, even though the disclosure is made with the client's knowledge and con-
sent. Nor would a physician's or psychotherapist's keeping of confidential records nec-
essary to diagnose or treat a patient, such as confidential hospital records, be a waiver
of the privilege, even though other authorized persons have access to the records. Simi-
larly, the patient's presentation of a physician's prescription to a registered pharmacist
would not constitute a waiver of the physician-patient privilege because such disclosure
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the physician
is consulted. See also Evidence Code § 992. Communications such as these, when
made in confidence, should not operate to destroy the privilege even when they are
made with the consent of the client or patient. Here, again, the privilege holder has
not evidenced any abandonment of secrecy. Hence, he should be entitled to maintain
the confidential nature of his communications to his attorney or physician despite the
necessary further disclosure."
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In keeping with this expression of legislative intent, the court in Rudnick
declared Green v. Superior Court invalid under the new statutes.
Justice Sullivan responded to petitioner's fourth argument, that,
without the writ, discovery would be excessively burdensome, by restat-
ing the basic principle that "there can be no discovery of matter which is
privileged."' 2 Thus, it matters little how burdensome or even impossible
discovery becomes, if it is denied pursuant to the valid exercise of the
physician-patient privilege.
The new standard which the court proceeded to announce in
Rudnick is that where disclosure to a third party, by either the patient or
his physician, was "reasonably necessary" for the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the patient consulted the physician, the third party
may assert the privilege on behalf of an absent patient regardless of
whether or not the patient has consented to the disclosure. If the
communication was not "reasonably necessary," however, there are two
possibilities. The first is that the patient consented to the disclosure
either impliedly or expressly. In this case, he will be deemed to have
waived the privilege under the provisions of section 912(a), and there
will be no privilege for the third party to assert.53 The second possibility
is that the patient did not consent to the disclosure and thus did not
waive the privilege. In this situation, if the patient is a party, he may
prevent disclosure by the third party under the provisions of section
994.54 Moreover, if the patient is not a party to the action, the third
party cannot assert the privilege on the patient's behalf;5 5 however, the
court either on its own motion or on defendant's motion may exercise
52. 11 Cal. 3d at 929, 523 P.2d at 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 607, citing Greyhound
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. 2d 355, 395, 364 P.2d 266, 287, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 111
(1961), and CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 2016(b), 2031 (West Supp. 1975).
53. Cf. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 430, 467 P.2d 557, 566, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
839 (1970).
54. Accord, Henard v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 129, 133, 102 Cal. Rptr. 721,
724 (1972): "While the argument that the doctor-patient privilege can be successfully
invoked by a third party may be sound in cases where the disclosure of the privileged
information necessarily destroys the privilege, it has no validity in a case where, as here,
the privilege can be effectively asserted by those entitled to do so."
55. This conclusion is consistent with the statutory language and the court's rea-
soning. There still is a privilege because the patient has not waived it, yet the third
party not being "reasonably necessary" for treatment, cannot be found to have implied
authorization to assert the privilege on the patient's behalf. The result is a privilege
with no one to assert it. The court thus recognizes the practice of allowing the trial
court, either sua sponte or on motion of a party, to protect the privilege. 11 Cal. 3d
at 933 n.12, 573 P.2d at 651, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610. However, the privacy of the pa-
tient is most precarious under these circumstances because there is no certainty that ei-
ther the court or the parties will raise the objection. The necessity for an affirmative
duty of the court to be vigilant in guarding the absent patient's privacy, then, becomes
clear. See text accompanying notes 100-106 infra.
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its discretion to protect the absentee holder of the privilege.56
Policy Considerations
The California courts have articulated a two-fold purpose for the
physician-patient privilege:5 7 (1) to encourage the patient's full disclo-
sure to his physician of all information necessary for proper diagnosis
and treatment;58 (2) "to preclude the humiliation of the patient that
might follow disclosure of his ailments." 59
In contrast, the common law rule rejecting any such privilege for
communications between a physician and his patient was grounded on
the theory that "disclosure of the whole truth was essential to the proper
administration of justice and that the need for it far outweighed any
considerations of professional confidence."60 It is unquestionably true
that relevant factual material will be denied discovery or introduction
when the privilege is properly asserted.
Therefore, in deciding whether or not to recognize a physician-
patient privilege, the legislature must weigh the necessity for confiden-
tiality in the physician-patient relationship and the interests of the
patient in maintaining the privacy of his body against the interests of
justice in the discovery of all relevant evidence. The next two sections of
this note discuss the balancing of these conflicting interests, first in
jurisdictions other than California, and then in California.
Other Jurisdictions
Common law scholars have sharply criticized the physician-patient
privilege, 61 favoring full disclosure of all relevant information at trial.
56. 11 Cal. 3d at 932-33, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
57. In re Estate of Flint, 100 Cal. 391, 396-97, 34 P. 863, 864 (1893); Green
v. Superior Ct., 220 Cal. App. 2d 121, 125, 33 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606 (1963).
58. See, e.g., McRae v. Erickson, 1 Cal. App. 326, 331-32, 82 P. 209, 211-12
(1,905) quoting In re Bruendl's Will, 102 Wis. 47, 78 N.W. 169 (1899): "'[the privi-
lege] facilitate[s] and make[s] safe full and confidential disclosure by patient to physi-
cian of all facts, circumstances, and symptoms, untranmeled by apprehension of their
subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness-stand, to the end that
the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient'." To McCormick, this is the only valid purpose of the privilege: "The
encouragement of freedom of disclosure by the patient so as to aid in the effective treat-
ment of disease and injury. To attain this objective, the immediate effect of the privi-
lege is to protect the patient against the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which
disclosure would entail." McCoRMICK, supra note 6, § 98, at 213.
59. City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231
P.2d 26, 28 (1951).
60. DEWrrr, supra note 6, at 10.
61. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 101, at 212; 8 WIGMORE, supra note
1, §§ 2380, 2380a, at 818, 829; Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is lustice Served
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Professor Wigmore saw the privilege as meaning "little but the suppres-
sion of useful truth."8 2 In coming to this conclusion, Wigmore applied
four conditions precedent to the granting of any privilege:
63
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.
Wigmore denied the existence of all but the third requirement in the
physician-patient relationship.64 First, he asserted that except in the
cases of criminal abortion and venereal disease, the patient does not
consider the information confidential and, in fact, makes little effort to
maintain its secrecy. Second, he contended that the possibility of disclo-
sure in court would not deter a patient from making a full disclosure of
his symptoms to his doctor. Finally, as to condition four, Wigmore was
strongly committed to full disclosure of all relevant matter to facilitate
accurate fact finding. He rarely acknowledged that the injury which
disclosure caused to a particular relationship could outweigh the benefits
to be gained for the correct disposal of litigation. Thus, Wigmore was
inclined to oppose the concept of privilege in general."5
McCormick echoed the arguments of Wigmore and concluded that
or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J 607
(1943); Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. REv. 285 (1943). See also Green v. Superior Ct., 220 Cal.
App. 2d 121, 125, 33 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606 (1963).
62. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2380a, at 831.
63. Id. § 2285, at 527.
64. Id. § 2380a, at 829-30.
65. Louisell & Sinclair, supra note 25, at 54-55, criticized this strong inclination
in the "eminent evidence scholars whose distaste for the privileges stems from a focus
on the social importance of accurate fact finding in litigation and from the conviction
that confidentiality in virtually all relationships must give way to compulsory testimony.
It seems, however, that such stress on the undeniable value of accurate fact finding and
full disclosure of relevant information has led certain modem commentators to ignore
the significance for human freedom of well-considered privileges for confidential com-
munications.
Moreover, the necessity for compelled disclosure of confidential communications is
no longer great, if it ever was. Often the communication pertains to an objective fact,
the ascertainment of which, if actually of import in deciding an issue, is feasible through
analysis of sources extrinsic to the confidential communication. Given the tremendous
development in the availability and utilization of discovery proceedings, the need for
forced disclosure of confidential communications is even less compelling."
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experience "has demonstrated that the privilege in the main operates not
as the shield of privacy but as the protector of fraud." He urged its
abandonment.066
McCormick and Wigmore shared the opinion that the physician-
patient privilege statutes owe their survival to a misplaced reliance by
state legislatures on an alleged analogy between the physician-patient
relationship and the attorney-client relationship.67 Both commentators
distinguished the two relationships on the basis of motivation at the time
of consultation. When the patient consults his physician, they thought,
he seeks treatment of his illness. Because he is usually not then mindful
of future disclosure of those conditions in a courtroom, such a possibility
does not contribute substantially to a withholding of information from
his physician. On the other hand, a client usually consults his attorney
with the possibility of litigation in mind, and in the absence of a
privilege protecting him against future disclosure, he would be more
likely to be deterred from providing all the data the attorney needs to
prepare the case adequately.
These views prevailed in the committee of the American Law
Institute, and their Model Evidence Code contained no physician-patient
privilege. When the recommendations were presented to the member-
ship at large, however, there was such support for the privilege that the
draft was rewritten, and the privilege appeared in the final 1942 Code.68
Even as amended, the Model Evidence Code contained a series of
limitations on the privilege designed to alleviate some of the injustices
which critics had attributed to it.69 As it turned out, the code's impor-
tance was limited to academic debate. It failed to gain acceptance in the
legal community and was not adopted by any state legislature.7"
In 1948, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws set out to reform the law of evidence and used the Model
Evidence Code as a starting point. The 1950 meeting of the conference
resulted in the elimination once more of the physician-patient privilege,
but the conference reversed itself in 1953 and voted to recognize the
privilege.7 Thereafter, the conference included in its Uniform Rules of
Evidence Rule 27, which provided for the privilege in essentially the
66. McCoRMICK, supra note 6, § 105, at 228.
67. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 105, at 224-25; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§ 2380a, at 830-31. Caution must be used in analogizing from authority for one privi-
lege to another because of the essentially different policy questions involved. In re Lif-
shutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 434 n.20, 467 P.2d 557, 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 842 (1970).
68. 19 ALI PROCEEDINGS 183-217 (1942); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rules 220-
223 (1942).
69. Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Clos-
ing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607, 616 (1943).
70. DEWrrr, supra note 6, at 19-20.
71. ld. at 20.
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same language used in Rules 220-223 of the Model Evidence Code.72
Although Rule 27 was included, however, it was enclosed in brackets;
apparently the conference was reluctant to recommend that states adopt
the privilege. 73 Professor McCormick endorsed the Uniform Rules as a
step in the right direction, as he felt that they eliminated the principal
abuses of the privilege.
7 4
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence provid-
ed yet another arena for the privilege debate. 75 The committee, which
drafted the rules for the United States Supreme Court, eliminated the
physician-patient privilege, stating that "the exceptions which have been
found necessary in order to obtain information required by the public
interest or to avoid fraud are so numerous as to leave little if any basis
for the privilege. '7' The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence did, how-
ever, include a psychotherapist-patient privilege.
The Proposed Federal Rules were promulgated by the Supreme
Court on November 20, 1972, and were transmitted to Congress by the
Chief Justice on February 5, 1973, to become effective on July 1 of that
year. Congress erected a roadblock, however, by enacting a statute
under which the rules would become effective only upon the legislature's
72. 8 WIGMoIIE, supra note 1, § 2380, at 820 n.5.
73. McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAs L.
REv. 559, 571 (1955).
74. McCo.MicK, supra note 6, § 105, at 226-27. See note 88 & accompanying
text infra.
75. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exempt privileged material from dis-
covery. See F.D. R. Civ. PRoc. 26(b)(1). FED. R. Cirv. PRoc. 35(b) provides for a
waiver of the privilege where the plaintiff requests a copy of the physical examination
of plaintiff conducted by defendant's physician, but does not contain a definition of
what is privileged. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "the rules
of evidence applicable in the United States District Courts var[ied] with the state in
which the court [sat] and the nature of the case. In civil cases the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [Rule 43(a)] prescribe[d] admission of evidence when either a federal
statute or rule of evidence or a state rule of evidence applicable in a state court of gen-
eral jurisdiction would admit it. Thus, if a doctor-patient privilege [was] abrogated by
any of these three, it need not [have been] recognized in federal civil cases." Whitford,
The Physician, the Law, and the Drug Abuser, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 938 (1971).
See notes 80-83 and accompanying text, infra, for a discussion of the effect of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.
76. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates (1973), rule 504,
Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241-42 (1972).
77. Id., rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240-41. Seven states (Alabama, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Tennessee) currently have a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege but not a physician-patient privilege; Compare WIOMoan,
supra note 1, § 2286, at 534 n.23 (1961 & Supp. 1975) with id. § 2380, at 819 n.5
(1961 & Supp. 1975). Apparently these jurisdictions consider the public policy argu-
ments in favor of confidentiality more compelling with regard to the psychotherapist-
patient relationship than to the physician-patient relationship.
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express approval. 78 Thereafter Congress passed its own version of the
rules and President Ford signed them in law on January 2, 1975.79 In
this process, article V, which concerns privileges, was completely rewrit-
ten. The new article eliminates specific sections on the various privileges
and substitutes a single provision ° which requires the federal courts to
follow the common law rules unless the state in which the court sits has
a specific provision for the privilege in question. If such provision exists,
the district court is to observe the state statute. The rationale behind this
change, the House Committee on the Judiciary explained, was that there
is no federal interest strong enough to justify deviation from the state
law and that inclusion of specific federal rules of privilege would
encourage forum shopping.81 The effect of the law, then, is that the
privilege does not exist unless specifically provided for by state law. At
present, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have passed
statutes changing the common law and recognizing a physician-patient
privilege, 2 while the other twelve have not.83
The statutes do vary widely as to the scope of the information
which they cover and the persons who come within their purview." It is
78. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, 87 Stat. 9; H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st sess.
3-4 (1973).
79. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. The Federal
Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.
80. "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu-
tory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or de-
fense to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law." FED. R. Evm. 501.
81. "The rationale underlying the proviso is that federal law should not supersede
that of the States in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason. The
Committee believes that in civil cases in the federal courts where an element of a claim
or defense is not grounded upon a federal question, there is no federal interest strong
enough to justify departure from State policy. In addition, the Committee considered
that the Court's proposed Article V would have prompted forum shopping in some civil
actions, depending upon differences in the privilege law applied as among the State and
federal courts. The Committee's proviso, on the other hand, under which the federal
courts are bound to apply the State's privilege law in actions founded upon a State-cre-
ated right or defense, removes the incentive to 'shop'." H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d
Cong., 1st sess. 9 (1973).
82. Compare 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2380, at 819-27 n.5 with Louisell & Sin-
clair, supra note 25, at 32 n.11 for listings of the statutes by state. See generally Mc-
CoRMIcK, supra note 6, § 98, at 212-13.
83. Those states are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont.
See 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 459 n.5 (1969).
84. A particularly interesting statute is that of North Carolina: "Provided, that
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
interesting to note also that five of the states have enacted statutes
creating a physician-patient privilege since 1960.15 Thus, state legisla-
tures have not heeded the scholarly exhortations to abandon the privi-
lege. The criticism has been effective, however, in fostering limitations
on the privilege similar to those found in the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence.
California
California is among those states which have statutorily changed the
common law rule and recognized a physician-patient privilege. As noted
above, the first such law in California was passed in 185186 and was in
effect continuously until 1965, when the legislature repealed the original
act and replaced it with Evidence Code sections 990 to 1007. These
sections, patterned after Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
8 7
retain the physician-patient privilege but include twelve exceptions88
designed to eliminate certain situations in which injustice has resulted
from its use."' At the same time the new sections provide the protection
of the privilege to a broader range of people.
The significance of Rudnick v. Superior Court90 is its interpreta-
tion that these new statutes also increased the range of people who may
be authorized to claim the privilege on behalf of the patient.
In order to effectuate fully the policies upon which the privilege is
based, third parties must have not only the authorization but also the
the court, either at the trial or prior thereto, may compel such disclosure, if in his opin-
ion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8-53 (1969). A similar provision was introduced by Assemblyman McAllister in the
1975-76 regular session of the California Legislature: "There is no privilege under this
article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of a patient
who is a party to the proceeding where good cause for the disclosure of the communica-
tion is shown to the court." A.B. 73 (1974). A.B. 73 was amended February 11, 1975
to apply only to cases seeking the recovery of damages on account of the conduct of
the patient.
85. McCoRMc, supra note 6, at 212-13.
86. See note 5 supra.
87. Compare CALIFoRNI_ LAW REVISION COMMfN, RECOMMENDATONS PROPOSING
AN EvIDENCE CoDE 29-37, 185-93 (1965) with 6 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N,
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES
RElATING TO THE UNIFoRM RULES OF EVIDENCE, 229-37, 402-16 (1974).
88. "[Personal injury cases, services in aid of a crime or tort, criminal proceed-
ings, damage actions for criminal conduct of the patient, will contests, malpractice cases,
disputes as to the intention of the patient as to a writing affecting property, validity
of same, commitment proceedings, restoration proceedings, certain required reports, pro-
ceedings to terminate a license or privilege." McCORMICK, supra note 6, § 105, at 227
n.95.
89. Id. § 105, at 226-27.
90. 11 Cal. 3d 924, 523 P.2d 643, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1974).
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duty to assert the privilege to protect the absent patient's privacy.
Further, the courts must have a concurrent duty to recognize the privi-
lege. In defense of these contentions this note will consider the threshold
issue of authorization and will then articulate why affirmative duties
of assertion and recognition are necessary.
Authorization
In recognition of the policy decision made by the legislature in
favor of confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship, California
courts have consistently construed the privilege statutes in favor of the
patient." To this end, courts generally take care to protect the privacy of
individual patients by precluding the matching of identities with illness-
es.92 In a footnote specifically directed to the trial court, the California
Supreme Court in Rudnick enumerated specific tests for the proper
disclosure of either identity or condition. First, if disclosing the patient's
name would reveal his condition,93 the privilege would not be violated.
If the converse is true, however, and revelation of the patient's name
within the context of the case would inevitably lead to connection of his
illness with his name, the privilege would be violated, and disclosure
should not be allowed. Second, if disclosure would reveal the nature of
an illness but not the identity of the patient, disclosure of the informa-
tion would not violate the privilege. Although the opinion does not
mention the converse of this situation,94 the court strongly implies, and
its reasoning would seem to require, that it is considered a violation of
the privilege to permit disclosure of the ailments in a context in which
such revelation would invariably result in the patient's identity being
connected with those conditions.
Because the legislature and the courts are careful to protect the
patient's privacy to this extent, it seems reasonable that a third party
who has obtained confidential information in the normal course of
91. See, e.g., Carlton v. Superior Ct., 261 Cal. App. 2d 282, 288, 67 Cal. Rptr.
568, 572 (1968); cases cited note 15, supra; cf. Roberts v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 3d 330,
337, 508 P.2d 309, 313, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 313 (1973) (psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 437, 467 P.2d 557, 572, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 844
(1970) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
92. "The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the pa-
tient that might follow disclosure of his ailments." Rudnick v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.
3d 924, 933 n.13, 523 P.2d 643, 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 (1974) quoting City and
County of San Francisco v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. 2d 227, 232, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (1951).
93. 11 Cal. 3d 924, 933 n.13, 523 P.2d 643, 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610 (1974).
94. The reason the court may not have mentioned the converse in footnote 13
is that in Rudnick the drug company had received adverse reaction reports from all over
the country, and thus, disclosure of ailments alone in this context would not likely be
connected with the patient's identity. Thus, this logical possibility did not suggest itself
in this case.
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treatment should be able to assert the privilege on the patient's behalf.
Otherwise, the patient would have an extensive right without adequate
means of asserting it.95 In such a situation the efficacy of the right would
be in serious question.
Thus, the policy base upon which Rudnick rests is quite sound. In
this era, when large concentrations of population, modem computer
technology, and the specialized state of the medical art make the partici-
pation of numerous third parties more than reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purpose for which the physician was consulted, the
patient's privacy may be properly protected only by empowering such
third parties to assert the privilege to protect the patient in his absence.
Duty
Such authorization was found by an Arizona court dealing with a
statute9 " even more restrictive than California's. In Tucson Medical
Center Inc. v. Rowles,97 the plaintiff brought an action for medical
malpractice against the Tucson Medical Center, alleging that the hospi-
tal had been negligent in not providing her with an obstetrician when
her own obstetrician was delayed and she developed complications while
waiting to give birth. Plaintiff sought the hospital records indicating
where the staff obstetrician had been during plaintiff's emergency. The
court held that defendant hospital could assert the physician-patient
privilege on behalf of those patients whose records would be included
and who were not parties to the action. The court concluded:
Despite the fact that A.R.S. § 12-2235 provides only that a
physician or surgeon shall not be examined as to privileged infor-
mation, our decision above that hospital records are covered by the
physician-patient privilege mandates that the hospital assert this
privilege when neither the patient nor his physician are parties to
the proceeding. To hold otherwise would deprive a patient of the
confidentiality granted him by A.R.S. § 12-2235 simply because
neither he nor his physician have [sic] any interest in the outcome
of the proceedings. Moreover, we feel obligated to carry this rea-
soning one step further and hold that when the holder of the
physician-patient privilege is absent from the proceedings with no
opportunity to assert the privilege, it is incumbent upon the trial
court to frame its discovery orders in a manner which will protect
95. DEWrrr, supra note 6, at 229.
96. "In a civil action a physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his
patient, be examined as to any communication made by his patient with reference to
any physical or supposed physical disease or any knowledge obtained by personal exam-
ination of the patient." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1956). This statute was
amended subsequent to the case discussed in the text to permit consent by a guardian
or a conservator and to include mental conditions. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235
(Supp. 1974).
97. 21 Ariz. App. 424, 520 P.2d 518 (1974).
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an absent patient. .... It would be absurd to hold that our legis-
lature intended that one unable to assert the privilege because of
his absence from the proceedings has a lesser right to confidential-
ity under A.R.S. § 12-2235 than one who is a party to the proceed-
ings. 98
Thus, the Arizona court went beyond a finding of authorization to
conclude that the third party and the court have an obligation to
effectuate the privilege. To protect adequately the privacy of the absent
patient, California's legislature and courts must take this extra step.
Given the broader coverage of its privilege statute, California is in an
even stronger position than was Arizona to impose this affirmative duty
on third parties and the courts when the patient is not present. Unfor-
tunately, the court in Rudnick used the word "may" to refer to both
assertion by the third party and protection of the absent patient's privacy
by the court.99 This language makes the patient's right dependent upon
the broad discretion of a third party or of the court, and as a result fails
to assure that the right will be accorded to the patient. Thus, the
Rudnick court should have used the word "shall" to alert both third
parties and courts, who might otherwise fail to act to protect the absent
patient, that they have a duty to do so.
With regard to at least some specified situations, the California
legislature seems clearly to have intended to impose such an affirmative
duty on the courts. 100 Section 916 of the Evidence Code' 01 applies only
to situations in which the patient is absent and neither a party nor the
person from whom the information is sought is a person authorized to
claim the privilege. 102 The language of section 916 is ostensibly manda-
tory; 10 3 however, the only court to comment on this section concluded
that it gave the trial judge discretion to recognize the privilege. 04
98. Id. at 429, 520 P.2d at 523.
99. 11 Cal. 3d at 933, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
100. "Section 916 . . . requires the presiding officer to recognize the privilege."
CAL. Evi. CODE § 916, Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
101. "(a) The presiding officer, on his own motion or on the motion of any party,
shall exclude information that is subject to a claim of privilege under this division if:
(1) The person from whom the information is sought is not a person authorized to
claim the privilege; and (2) There is no party to the proceeding who is a person au-
thorized to claim the privilege. (b) The presiding officer may not exclude information
under this section if: (1) He is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit
disclosure; or (2) The proponent of the evidence establishes that there is no person au-
thorized to claim the privilege in existence." CAL. Evm. CODE § 916 (West 1966).
102. Id.
103. "The presiding officer ... shall exclude.... ".Id.
104. Steams v. Los Angeles City School Dist., 244 Cal. App. 2d 696, 723, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 499-500 (1966) (attorney-client privilege): "Where the attorney fails to as-
sert the privilege when he should, the judge may exclude the information that is subject
to a claim of privilege on his own motion." (citation omitted) (emphasis added) The
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Similarly, although the court in Rudnick did not mention section 916 in
its opinion, it considered precisely the same set of circumstances to
which the statute applies and concluded that "the appropriate court, in
its discretion and on its own motion, may protect an absentee holder of
the privilege who has not waived it."'10 5 The courts, then, have failed to
give effect to the legislative intent expressed in this statute. 06 Therefore,
the legislature should amend section 916 to express more strongly its
intent by the insertion of language specifically stating that the courts
have an affirmative duty to recognize the privilege. 10 7 At the same time,
the legislature should extend application of the statute to even those
cases in which a person authorized to claim the privilege is present. Such
an extension of the court's duty to recognize the privilege would merely
provide an added degree of protection 0" by assuring the absent patient's
privacy regardless of whether or not a third party asserts the privilege.
precedent value of this decision, however, may be slight. First, this statement is dictum
because the court concluded that even though the communications in question were
never intended to be confidential in the first place, appellants had elicited the informa-
tion by other means and could not be prejudiced by an erroneous order sustaining the
privilege. Second, the issue arose when the trial judge excluded testimony by an attor-
ney regarding communications with his former client, the cross-defendant (who was nei-
ther present nor represented by counsel), after the attorney failed to claim the attorney-
client privilege. Both the trial court and the appellate court clearly misread section 916.
The attorney was unquestionably a "person authorized to claim the privilege," under sec-
tion 954, and, therefore, section 916 did not even apply to the facts presented by the
case.
105. 11 Cal. 3"d at 932-33, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610. See text ac-
companying notes 54-56, supra. It is unclear whether the court in Rudnick was constru-
ing section 916 or was unaware of its existence and applicability.
106. The reluctance of the courts to treat the language of Evidence Code section
916 as mandatory probably arises from the presence of Evidence Code section 918: "A
party may predicate error on a ruling disallowing a claim of privilege only if he is the
holder of the privilege . . . " This section has the effect of immunizing the trial judge
from error where he has incorrectly refused to recognize the privilege and the holder
of the privilege is not a party to the action. If, on the other hand, the judge in such
a situation had incorrectly recognized the privilege, either party could argue on appeal
that the trial court had committed reversible error in excluding relevant evidence. Thus,
when sections 916 and 918 are read side by side, it is clear that the safer course for
a trial judge to pursue when in doubt is to deny recognition of the privilege. As noted
in the text, this fact ultimately results in the thwarting of the clear legislative intent
embodied in section 916 that recognition of the privilege by the trial court to protect
the absent patient's privacy be mandatory.
107. South Dakota employs such language to impose a similar duty on its courts.
"In all cases where it shall appear to the court that any person who is not present nor
represented at the hearing should be protected in his right to have any communication
made under the confidential relations provisions of §§ 19-2-1 to 19-2-5 [§ 19-2-3, physi-
cian-patient privilege], inclusive, excluded, it shall be the duty of the court to make such
objections and orders for such purpose as to the court may seem necessary." S.D. CoM-
prr.u LAws ANN. § 19-2-9 (1967).
108. This statement assumes that an affirmative duty has been imposed on the
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With regard to third parties, California places only the physician
under an affirmative statutory duty to assert the privilege. 1 9 Unfortu-
nately, this statutory provision is very specifically worded to include only
the physician who received or made the confidential communication.
Had the legislature envisioned the full ramifications of its decision to
reverse the Green case and allow a third party to assert the privilege, it
would most probably have imposed the same affirmative duty on a third
party as it does on the physician.1 0 The purpose of the statute admits
of no distinction between a physician and a third party who satisfies the
Rudnick rule. The statute is designed to guarantee that the physician
will assert the privilege whenever the law allows him to do so, in order
to maintain the patient's confidences. Because it is the patient's privacy
that is at stake, it makes little difference who has the information. If that
person is permitted by law to assert the privilege, he should be under a
duty to do so. It must be emphasized that the imposition of such an
affirmative duty is directed at only one side of the scale, the policy
favoring protection of the patient's privacy. As has been pointed out
previously,"' the privilege derogates to some extent from the policy
favoring discovery and consideration by the trier of fact of all relevant
evidence. Naturally, this problem is enhanced by the recognition of an
affirmative duty to assert the privilege. If the balance is to be struck in
third party also. If none has been imposed, then the duty on the court would be the
sole protection.
109. "The physician who received or made a communication subject to the privilege
under this article shall claim the privilege whenever he is present when the communica-
tion is sought to be disclosed and is authorized to claim the privilege under subdivision
(c) of Section 994." CAL. EviD. CODE § 995 (West 1966). For a case decided under
former section 1881(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure in which the physician asserted
the privilege to protect his absent patient, see Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 116
Cal. App. 2d 445, 463-64, 254 P.2d 85, 96 (1953). Costa was cited with approval on
this point in Marcus v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24-25, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545, 547
(1971) (decided under the new statutes).
110. A necessary corollary to this affirmative duty to assert the privilege in court
may well be a statutory duty imposed upon the third party, like that imposed upon the
physician, to protect the confidentiality of the patient's medical information outside the
courtroom. Aside from the interests of the patient in his privacy the interests of justice
require that the assertion of the physician-patient privilege not result in the information
being public everywhere but in court. Such a situation is threatened, for example, by
the development of data processing enterprises which store medical information for in-
surance companies. One of many such companies has stored in its computers medical
backgrounds on some 12 million persons with that number growing by 40,000 per year.
Insurance Data Bank Attacked As Abuse of Confidentiality, 7 HOSPITAL PRACTIcE,
August 1972, at 47. The California Medical Association has "sought action to prohibit
the use of medical information for any purpose other than the evaluation of the specific
insurance claim in question, and to withdraw approval of the all-inclusive blanket con-
sent form that patients sign when they apply for insurance benefits." 119 CALIFORNIA
MEDICINE, December 1973, at 45.
111. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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favor of the patient's privacy, this mandatory assertion must not become
merely a shield behind which "the third party takes refuge to thwart the
interests of justice. Protecting the plaintiff's interest in discovery under
these circumstances requires the court to scrutinize the information in
question carefully to determine whether some form of disclosure can be
permitted which neither reveals the patient's identity nor provides suffi-
cient factual data for the identity to be ascertained through subsequent
investigation."
12
This dilemma could be eased at least partially if physicians were
scrupulously careful to transmit data only to third parties who are
reasonably necessary to the patient's treatment. Furthermore, the physi-
cian should satisfy himself at the outset that disclosure to the third party
of the patient's identity along with his medical information is itself
reasonably necessary to the third party's role in the normal course of
treatment."13 If the third party himself has no knowledge of the patient's
identity, the question of privilege simply would not arise, and the
patient's privacy would be effectively protected.
Applicability of the Rudnick Rule to
Other Third Parties
The court in Rudnick provided little insight into the meaning of
the phrase "reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which
the physician was consulted." Nevertheless, with the large number of
third parties who are privy to confidential information in the normal
course of the patient's treatment, the courts are likely to be faced with
cases seeking to have this phrase defined. The following is a discussion
of those third parties whose "reasonable necessity" for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose for which the patient consulted his physician might
well be challenged by a party attempting to discover the patient's
medical information.
Pharmacists
The court in Rudnick adopted the Senate Judiciary Committee's
analysis that presentation of a prescription to a pharamcist by either the
doctor or the patient would not constitute a waiver of the physician-
patient privilege because the pharmacist is "reasonably necessary" to the
fulfillment of the physician's purpose." 4 Thus, in declaring that the new
statutes had rendered Green invalid,"15 the court identified pharmacists
112. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
113. For example, does the receipt of the patient's name assist the drug company
in evaluating and utilizing adverse reaction reports?
114. 11 Cal. 3d at 932, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610; CAL. Evm.
CODE § 912(d) Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
115. 11 Cal. 3d at 932, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
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as third parties who would be able to assert the privilege within the
Rudnick rule.
Hospitals
Further investigation reveals that the Senate Judiciary Committee
did not intend that entries in hospital records constitute a waiver;
116
therefore, hospitals would also appear to be eligible to assert the privi-
lege. 117 According to the official comment to Evidence Code section
912: "Nor would a physician's or psychotherapist's keeping of confiden-
tial records necessary to diagnose or treat a patient, such as confidential
hospital records, be a waiver of the privilege, even though other author-
ized persons have access to the records.""18 Further evidence of legisla-
tive intent that hospital records be privileged information is found in
Evidence Code section 1156, enacted at the same time as the privilege
sections. 119 Section 1156 authorizes in-hospital committees to conduct
mortality and morbidity studies but specifically designates as privileged
any medical information disclosed to such committees with or without
the patient's consent. 20 Presumably, these expressions of legislative
116. CAL. Evm. CODE § 912, Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966). The
law in California under former § 1881(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure was rather
unclear on the question of whether or not hospital records came within the privilege.
McRae v. Erickson, 1 Cal. App. 326, 82 P. 209 (1905), held that records written by
a physician in charge of defendant hospital were within the privilege. In Frederick v.
Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 585, 57 P.2d 235 (1936), however, the court
ruled that hospital records were not within the protection of the privilege because they
had been written by two hospital interns who were not at the time working under the
direction of a physician, but were taking the patient's history for the purpose of the hos-
pital records. For a compilation of cases on the question of the admissibility of hospi-
tal records in other jurisdictions, see Hale, Hospital Records as Evidence, 14 S. CAL.
L. REv. 99 (1941).
117. As with many of the other points discussed in this note, introduction of some
of the evidence proferred may be subject to a hearsay objection. Generally, however,
hospital records fall within the business records exception to the rule. See CAL. EvID.
CODE §§ 1270-72 (West 1966).
118. CAL. EvD. CODE § 912(d) Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
See note 51, supra.
119. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975).
120. "The disclosure, with or without consent of the patient, of information con-
ceming him to such in-hospital medical staff committee does not make unprivileged any
information that would otherwise be privileged under Section 994 or 1014; but, notwith-
standing Sections 994 and 1014, such information is subject to discovery under subdivi-
sion (a) except that the identity of any patient may be discovered under subdivision
(a) unless the patient consents to such disclosure." CAL. Evm. CODE § 1156(b) (West
1966). The comment to section 1156 indicates the purpose of this section: "Section
1156 also makes it clear that the names of patients may not be disclosed without the
consent of the patient. This limitation is necessary to preserve the physician-patient
and psychotherapist-patient privileges." Id. Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West
1966).
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Peer review committees' 22 provide a rapidly proliferating group of
"third parties" involved with the question of privilege. Such committees
evaluate the qualifications, fitness, and character of fellow physicians,
particularly with regard to the extension of hospital staff privileges. To
perform their responsibilities properly these committess must review the
records of specific patients whom the physician under investigation has
treated.123 The legislature has relieved such committees of the necessity
of asserting the physician-patient privilege by statutorily providing that
their records be confidential and thus immune from discovery. This
protection also extends to local medical societies' medical review com-
mittees, which consider medical malpractice suits and advise lia-
bility insurance carriers as to the defensibility of such actions.' 24
121. See Marcus v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. App. 3d 22, 95 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1971).
In Marcus, the court went beyond the trial court decision that plaintiff was precluded
from discovering hospital records, to hold that the names and addresses of the patients
involved were also privileged from discovery. See note 31 supra.
122. Congress has mandated the establishment under the Social Security Act of
Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs), composed of physicians, who
are to evaluate their fellow doctors in order to improve the quality of care. Act of
October 30, 1972, § 249F, 86 Stat. 1429, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1301-20a (1971) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (Supp. I1, 1973) ).
123. To encourage the disclosure of information to these committees the California
legislature passed a statute relieving one of any liability for such disclosure: "In addi-
tion to the privilege afforded by Section 47, there shall be no monetary liability on the
part of, and no cause of action for damages shall arise against, any person on account
of the communication of information in the possession of such person to any hospital,
hospital medical staff, professional society, medical or dental school, or professional li-
censing board, when such communication is intended to aid in the evaluation of the
qualifications, fitness or character of the practitioner of the healing arts and does not
represent as true any matter not reasonably believed to be true." Cal. Stat. 1974, ch.
1086, § 1, at 796 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.8 (West Supp. 1975) ).
124. "Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of medical
staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of the qual-
ity of care rendered in the hospital or medical review committees of local medical soci-
eties shall be subject to discovery." CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1157 (West Supp. 1975).
Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974), held that
section 1157 prohibits the discovery of files of a medical staff committee, but it does
not prevent the discovery of a hospital's administrative records. Thus here is another
potential source of invasion of the absent patient's privacy. The crucial nature to the ab-
sent patient of the protection accorded to the peer review committee by section 1157 and
Matchett is suggested by the holding in a Missouri Court of Appeals decision, Klinge
v. Lutheran Medical Center of St. Louis, 518 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), that
the physician could not assert the physician-patient privilege to prevent a staff committee
from reviewing patient records for the purpose of evaluating the physician's perform-
ance.
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Similarly, the legislature has created a specific protection for the records
and proceedings on nonprofit medical foundations, composed of physi-
cians who evaluate doctors and determine for the government and
private health insurance carriers the validity of benefit claims submitted
by physicians for their services.' 25
Health Insurance Companies
Health and accident insurance companies also frequently receive
confidential information arising from the physician-patient relationship.
Applying the Rudnick test, one must first determine whether or not
disclosure to these insurance carriers is "reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the physician was consult-
ed.""" If it is "reasonably necessary," then the insurance company
should be able to assert the privilege to protect the privacy of the absent
patient whose medical information the carrier holds.127 The rapidly
increasing costs of medical care today require all but the most affluent to
carry some form of health insurance or to depend upon public health
care services.' 2 From an economic standpoint, then, it may be argued
125. "Except in actions involving a claim of a provider of health care services for
payment for such services, the prohibition relating to discovery or testimony provided
by Section 1157 shall be applicable to the proceedings or records of an organized com-
mittee of any nonprofit medical care foundation which is a component or subsidiary of
a medical society, and which is organized in a manner which makes available profes-
sional competence to review health care services with respect to medical necessity, qual-
ity of care, or economic justification of charges or level of care." CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1157.5 (West Supp. 1975).
126. 11 Cal. 3d at 933, 523 P.2d at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
127. Id.
128. Whether those receiving public social services have the right to confidential
medical records is beyond the scope of this article because of the complexity of that
issue. The current controversy in that area arises from the necessity for government
to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of its programs. The balancing of patient
confidentiality against government accountability involves many considerations which
could best be developed elsewhere. Suffice it to say that reports by physicians to gov-
ernment social service agencies are specifically made confidential by CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 10850 (West Supp. 1975) and therefore are not within the scope of
the public documents exception to the physician-patient privilege found in CAL. EvD.
CODE § 1006 (West 1966). See also note 146, infra. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 5328 (West Supp. 1975) makes confidential all information and records obtained in
providing services under various mental health programs. In County of Riverside v. Su-
perior Ct., 42 Cal. App. 3d 478, 116 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1974), the appellate court upheld
the refusal by an alcoholism crisis and referral center to turn over its records to the
State Board of Chiropractic Examiners in connection with its investigation of a chiro-
practor who was voluntarily receiving treatment at the center. The court rejected the
board's argument that it should be included under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5328
(f) (West Supp. 1975), excepting disclosure to the courts where necessary to the admin-
istration of justice, on the basis that it was investigating an accusation seeking suspen-
sion or revocation of the chiropractor's license and alleging habitual intemperance to
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that health insurance is within the realm of "reasonable necessity."
Because health insurance companies acquire the patient's medical re-
ports as part of the delivery of health care, the companies should be able
to assert the privilege on behalf of the absent patient. To hold otherwise
would be to endorse the proposition that those who are wealthy enough
to pay for their medical care without the purchase of health insurance
have a greater right to privacy than those who cannot shoulder these
costs. 129 Such a conclusion is inimical to public policy in an egalitarian
society.
Once it is concluded that disclosure to a health insurance company
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which
the physician was consulted, it is immaterial under the Rudnick test
whether or not the patient has expressly or impliedly authorized such
disclosure.13 0
Life Insurance Companies
Another third party which collects and stores medical files is the
life insurance company. With regard to transmittal of medical informa-
tion to these entities, there is no sound basis for the argument that the
disclosure is within the normal course of treatment of the patient.
Thus, following Rudnick, the question is whether or not the patient
such an extent as to incapacitate him for the performance of his professional duties.
The court concluded that had the legislature intended such an exception for administra-
tive agencies it would have specifically provided therefor. County of Riverside v. Supe-
rior Ct., 42 Cal. App. 3d 478, 481, 116 Cal. Rptr. 886, 888 (1974). See also CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2714 (West Supp. 1975) which provides that medical records ob-
tained in the administration of the State Disability Insurance Program shall remain con-
fidential and shall not be published or open to public inspection except "to the extent
necessary for the proper administration of [the State Disability Insurance Program] or
to the extent necessary for the proper administration of public social services pursuant
to the Welfare and Institutions Code. . . ." This act was passed to protect the confi-
dentiality of reports of independent medical examiners concerning disability insurance
claims. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2111 (West Supp. 1975) imposes a misdemeanor
penalty for unauthorized disclosure.
129. See Hassard, Privileged Communications; Physician-Patient Confidences in
California, 90 CALIFOmNI MmicmE, June 1959, at 411. The author, the general coun-
sel for the California Medical Association, anticipated the tension to which the text re-
fers: "With the rapid growth of health insurance, the instances in which a physician
is required to divulge confidential information to a third party have drastically in-
creased. In these cases the patient's economic interests require disclosure. Frequently,
his medical interests may call for nondisclosure and hence, a conflict exists." Id. at
418.
130. In fact, in many cases the patient signs no authorization or waiver because
it is often the physician who becomes eligible for payment directly from the insurance
carrier. An example would be a Blue Shield policyholder being treated by a Blue Shield
member doctor.
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has consented to the disclosure. 3' A patient must invariably sign a
waiver at the time he applies for a life insurance policy. If the waiver is
valid, there is no privilege for either the patient or the life insurance
company to assert.
When faced with the question of the validity of these waiver
clauses, the California courts have held that although "[tihe privilege
may be waived. . . it must clearly appear there is an intention to waive,
and a court will not run to such conclusion"'1 2 but will in fact strictly
construe the waiver.' 33 Even applying this strict standard, courts have
held such waivers valid. 34 The only case law on the point, however,
involves suits arising from actions on the policy itself, and under the new
Evidence Code the privilege would not be assertable in such actions in
any case.'
One could argue that the life insurance agreement is an adhesion
contract and that therefore the patient does not give his consent to
disclosure "without coercion" as is required for a waiver of the privilege
under Evidence Code section 912(a). 3 6 Life insurance contracts do
131. "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of any person to claim
a privilege provided by Section . . . 994 (physician-patient privilege) . . . is waived
with respect to a communication protected by such privilege if any holder of the privi-
lege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has con-
sented to such disclosure made by anyone." CAL. Evm. CODE § 912(a) (West 1966).
132. Torbenson v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 404, 329 P.2d 596,
597-98 (1958) (citations omitted).
133. Turner v. Redwood Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 573, 576-77, 57 P.2d
222, 223 (1936). See also Note, Evidence: Privileged Communication: Physician and
Patient, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 108 (1936); cf. Roberts v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 3d 330, 343,
508 P.2d 309, 317, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1973) (attorney-client privilege).
134. In Turner v. Redwood Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n, 13 Cal. App. 2d 573, 575, 57
P.2d 222, 223 (1936), the court held the following provision without effect as to subse-
quent communications between the signor and his physicians: "I hereby authorize any
doctor at any time to give to said association any information he or she may have re-
garding me." Id. at 577-78, 57 P.2d at 223. In support of this holding the court cited
a series of decisions from other jurisdictions which, while refusing to give prospective
effect to such a waiver, did recognize its validity as to medical communications made
prior to the patient's signing. Id. at 576-77, .57 P.2d at 223-24. Torbenson v. Family
Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 403, 329 P.2d 596, 597 (1958), found the following
provision valid: "To Whom it May concern: I hereby authorize and request you to
disclose any and all information and records concerning my condition when under ob-
servation by you, if requested to do so [by the life insurance company]."
135. "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to
an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by...
(c) Any party claiming as a beneficiary of the patient through a contract to which the
patient is or was a party ....... CAL. Evm. CODE § 996 (West 1966).
136. The discussion of waiver herein is also applicable to health insurance con-
tracts should the court refuse to accept the notion that disclosure of the confidential
information to health insurance companies is "reasonably necessary."
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bear the heavy stamp of adhesion. 137 They customarily provide standard
terms over which there is no bargaining and concerning which there is
little variation from company to company. As a result, it is highly
unlikely that an applicant for life insurance knowingly and understand-
ingly accepts a waiver clause. Furthermore, even if he does understand
the waiver, the average citizen's need for life insurance prevents his
exercising free choice in accepting it.
Nevertheless, the court is not likely to find the waiver clause invalid
as against public policy, as such a clause is essential to the insurance
industry. Without the waiver, physicians, who have both ethical and
legal responsibilities to maintain the confidences of their patients, must
refuse to release information to the life insurance companies. As a result,
life insurance companies would not have access to the information
required to assess properly the insurability of the applicant-patient.
The recognition of a limited waiver is equally infeasible. Although
Evidence Code section 994(b) provides that the privilege may be
claimed by "a person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the
holder of the privilege," 38 the only context in which an express authori-
zation to claim the privilege could be given to a life insurance company
would be in conjunctibn with either an implied or an express consent to
disclosure. Thus, by the provisions of Evidence Code section 912(a), to
which section 994 is specifically made subject, any time a patient gave
an express authorization to claim the privilege he would be waiving the
privilege at the same time, thus rendering the authorization ineffectual.
Express authorization, which the Rudnick court sought initially,' 39
can be given only within the terms of Evidence Code section 912(d).
Again, under the Rudnick rule, an express authorization to. claim the
privilege may be extended only to a third party to whom disclosure is
"reasonably necessary," for in that instance the fact that the patient has
expressly or impliedly consented to disclosure is immaterial. This situa-
tion is the only one in which a limited waiver is possible, as the patient is
considered to have waived his privilege only with regard to that third
party and not for all times and in all places. Under any other circum-
stances, as in the case of life insurance contracts, the seal of secrecy is
considered to have been broken; because the information has not been
137. See Note, The Adhesion Contract of Insurance, 5 SANTA CLARA LAw. 60
(1964). For cases holding the provision in a life insurance contract void as against
public policy see Gilchrist v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Mich. 247, 163 N.W.
10 (1917); Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias, 82 App. Div. 359, 81 N.Y.S.
813 (1903), aft'd, 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111, aff'd 198 U.S. 503 (1904); Robinson v.
Supreme Commandery, 38 Misc. 97, 77 N.Y.S. 111 (1902), aff'd mem., 177 N.Y. 564,
69 N.E. 1130 (1904).
138. CAL. EvID. CoDE § 994(b) (West Supp. 1975).
139. 11 Cal. 3d at 929, 523 P.2d at 647-48, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 607-08.
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maintained in confidence by the patient outside the courtroom, the
patient will not be allowed to prevent its disclosure inside the court-
room.
14 0
Thus, in signing an application for life insurance to guarantee the
security of his survivors, the applicant is required to surrender his
privacy.' 4 ' This result is somewhat harsh in view of the fact that the
patient has not truly evidenced abandonment of secrecy 42 any more
than he does when he presents his prescription to a pharmacist. It is
reasonable that the applicant would expect that his physician would
release information in confidence to the life insurance company and that
the company, rather than making that information public, would use it
for the limited purpose of ascertaining the applicant's insurability under
the policy. Given the economic desirability of life insurance, the legisla-
ture should encourage its procurement and not require that its acquisi-
tion be made at the price of privacy. An amendment to section 912 of
the Evidence Code is necessary to prevent such disclosure from consti-
tuting a waiver.
Government Agencies
Physicians are also required to disclose patient data to various
governmental agencies. One such reporting requirement directs physi-
cians to report the incidence of specified infectious, contagious and
communicable diseases to the State Department of Public Health. 43
Although such reporting benefits the community as a whole, it also may
well assist the physician in adequately treating his patient, particularly in
the case of large scale outbreaks, which provide significant amounts of
current data concerning a specific disease. Therefore, it seems feasible to
conclude that such reporting is reasonably necessary for the treatment of
the patient, and that the government agency may assert the physician-
patient privilege within the Rudnick rule. Moreover, this conclusion
serves sound public policy, for it would not be equitable that an illness
140. 6 CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUD-
IES, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE, 262 (1964).
141. Even if the patient is deceased, which is the most logical possibility because
a claimant would probably be seeking to discover the information about how the insur-
ance company has settled previous cases involving similar illnesses or accidents, there
still may be an interest of the patient's estate in confidentiality which the law will recog-
nize. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 993(c), Law Revision Comm'n Comment (West 1966).
142. See note 51 supra.
143. "All physicians . . . visiting any sick person, in any hotel, lodginghouse,
house, building, office, structure, or other place where any person is ill of any infec-
tious, contagious, or communicable disease, shall promptly report that fact to the health
officer, together with the name of the person, if known, the place where he is confined,
and the nature of the disease, if known." CAL. HEALTH & S, CODE § 3125 (West 1970).
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report which benefits the public should result in an individual's loss of
privacy. Such a personal loss serves no societal purpose.
Nonetheless, the Evidence Code specifically excludes use of the
privilege in situations involving required reports to state agencies when
those reports are open to public inspection.14" Among contagious dis-
ease reports,145 Title 17 of the California Administrative Code, which
sets forth the list of contagious diseases that must be reported, makes
only venereal disease reports confidential.' 4 Thus, the implication 'is
that the other disease reports are open to the public. Sections 211 and
211.5 of the California Health and Safety Code do make "special
morbidity and mortality studies" specifically confidential.147 Neverthe-
less, the California Attorney General has expressed doubt that "the
Department's continuous receipt of information concerning cases of
contagious disease is a 'special investigation' within the meaning of
section 211 . . ." 48Thus, there seems to be aninadvertent gap in the
law which should be filled by making all contagious disease reports
confidential.
It is true that the state government could refuse to make public
such information by asserting its privilege under Evidence Code section
1040.49 The assertion of the privilege under such circumstances would
be permissible and would not violate the California Public Records
144. "There is no provision under this article as to information that the physician
or the patient is required to report to a public employee, or as to information required
to be recorded in a public office, if such report or record is open to public inspection."
CAL. Evm. CODE § 1006 (West 1966).
145. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 2500.
146. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 2636. See 50 OP. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 10 (1970).
Cf. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 2505 (laboratory notification to public health officer
of communicable disease specimens involving venereal disease, tuberculosis, and typhoid
are confidential and not open to public inspection). See also 55 OP. CAL. Arr'Y GEN.
369 (1972), expressing the opinion that therapeutic abortion information from indi-
vidual hospitals, excluding identification of individual patients, must be made available
to public inspection.
147. "[The State Department of Health] shall cause special investigations of the
sources of morbidity and mortality and the effects of localities, employments, conditions
and circumstances on the public health and it shall perform such other duties as may
be required in procuring information for state and federal agencies regarding the effects
of these conditions on the public health." CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 211 (West 1970).
Section 211.5 makes records collected under section 211 confidential. Id. § 211.5.
148. 51 OP. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 217 (1968). The opinion concluded that the State
Board of Public Health may provide local blood banks with the identities of persons
known to be infected with viral hepatitis if such information be maintained in confi-
dence and be used only to screen potential donors.
149. "A public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose official information, and
to prevent another from disclosing such information, if the privilege is claimed by a
person authorized to do so. . . ." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040(b) (West 1966).
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Act' 50 because medical records are specifically exempted from disclo-
sure under the Act.' This privilege, however, belongs to the govern-
ment and may be asserted regardless of how the patient or his physician
treats the information in question. 5 2 Therefore, should the government
agency choose not to assert its privilege, there would be no protection of
the absent patient's privacy, as there would be no physician-patient
privilege for the court to recognize. 15 8
A second reporting requirement provides that physicians are to
make written report to the local health department concerning any
patient who has a disorder characterized by lapses of consciousness.5
The local health officer is to forward this report to the State Department
of Health, which in turn makes it available to the State Department of
Motor Vehicles for use in determining eligibility of the patient to be
licensed to operate a motor vehicle.' 55 The code section requiring such
reporting also specifically prescribes that the information shall be kept
confidential. 5"
Finally, the California Penal Code contains a requirement that
physicians report to law enforcement agencies any injuries inflicted by
deadly weapons or arising from the commission of a crime, 157 or any
non-accidental injury to a minor. ' 8 Failure to do so is punishable as
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6250-60 (West Supp. 1975).
151. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6254(c) (West Supp. 1975) excludes from required pub-
lic disclosure "[p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would con-
stitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy .... ." But see 55 Op. CAL. ATr'Y
GEN. 369 (1972) which concludes that the required reporting of therapeutic abortion
information under California Health and Safety Code section 25955.5 does not come
within the purview of this exception, because section 25955.5 "itself protects 'personal
privacy' by prohibiting the inclusion of the identification of any person having an abor-
tion." Id. at 370.
152. Richards v. Superior Ct., 258 Cal. App. 2d 635, 638, 65 Cal. Rptr. 917, 919-
20 (1968) held that even though both the doctor and the party examirfed may be willing
to allow disclosure, the government may exercise its privilege under CAL. EVlD. CODE
§ 1040 (West 1966) to prevent discovery of State Disability Insurance records on the
patient collected pursuant to CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2111, 2714 (West 1972 & Supp.
1975).
153. One solution to this problem would be to require the government to assert its
privilege. However, this alternative may have undesirable ramifications in the area of
government secrecy in a free society.
154. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 410 (West Supp. 1975). The State Department
of Health defines these disorders. Id. Examples of afflictions which have been so des-
ignated are "neurological disorders, senility, diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular disease, al-
coholism or excessive use of alcohol sufficient to bring about blackouts (retrograde am-
nesia for their activities while drinking)." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, § 2572.
155. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 410 (West Supp. 1975).
156. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 410(4) (West Supp. 1975).
157. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11160-61 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975).
158. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975). Provision for keep-
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a misdemeanor. 5" Unmistakably, should these reports result in crim-
inal prosecution, the physician-patient privilege would be inappli-
cable.10 In a civil action, if the reports are not characterized as public
documents, the patient may assert the privilege if he is a party.' 61 In
this case, the privilege is available even though the disclosure was not
reasonably necessary to the patient's treatment, provided that the pa-
tient did not consent to the disclosure. Penal Code section 11105 spe-
cifically states that records may be released by the Attorney General
from the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation files
to certain law enforcement agencies "for the due administration of the
laws, and not for the purpose of assisting a private citizen in carrying
on his personal interests or in maliciously or uselessly harassing, de-
grading or humiliating any person."'162 Therefore, the privilege is still
available to the patient, and if the patient is not a party, the court be-




The California Supreme Court in Rudnick made no finding as to
whether disclosure of adverse reaction information to drug companies is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose for which a patient
consulted his physician. Instead, the court remanded the case to the trial
court to make this determination. It would seem that these adverse
reaction reports meet the test which the trial court is to apply in making
its decision. In view of the fact that only the reports of patients who have
had adverse reactions are sent, only those patients who have a direct
interest in the feedback from the drug company to the physician are
involved. As was posited in Rudnick, the drug company is able to
ing records of these reports is made in CAl. PEN. CODE § 11110 (West 1970 & Supp.
1975).
159. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11162 (West 1970).
160. 'There is no privilege under this article in a criminal proceeding." CAL. EvID.
CODE § 998 (West 1966).
161. This statement assumes tiiat the information has not become public in a prior
criminal proceeding. It is also assumed that criminal conduct was not in fact involved,
in which case the privilege may be eliminated by either CAL. Evm. CODE § 997 (West
1966) (treatment sought to plan, commit, or escape detection or apprehension after,
commission of a crime or tort) or CAL. EviD. CODE § 999 (West 1966) (conduct of
the patient which constitutes a crime).
162. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1105 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975).
163. This would not prevent introduction of reports made by the physician pursu-
ant to CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1970 & Supp. 1975) in any civil action in
which a minor plaintiff alleged wilful child abuse, because the minor plaintiff would be
the holder of the privilege and could waive it. Furthermore, the patient-litigant excep-
tion contained in CAL. EvID. CODE § 996 (West 1966) would control, thus eliminating
the privilege.
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provide the physician with an opinion as to the relationship between the
patient's symptoms and his taking the drug in question only after receipt
of the physician's adverse reaction report. Thus, it can reasonably be
argued that the patient is directly benefited by the disclosure, since in
this way a physician may obtain the information reasonably necessary to
the adequate treatment of a patient who has had an adverse reaction. At
the same time, the benefit of such reports is shared by the public at
large, particularly because idiosyncratic reactions are discovered after
use of the drug by the public, even though the drug has undergone
detailed testing prior to Food and Drug Administration licensing. This
public benefit creates a strong policy argument in favor of finding the
disclosure "reasonably necessary." Moreover, the question of the availa-
bility of confidential medical information held by third parties is appar-
ently being raised with increasing frequency. If a drug company cannot
assure a physician that it will maintain the confidentiality of the reports,
the physician might refuse to send them, fearing civil liability or loss of
license. Thus, the drug company might not receive the information it
needs to fulfill the legal obligation which it owes both the FDA and the
public to improve the quality of its product and to provide adequate
warnings as to its use.' In this eventuality, both the patient with an
adverse reaction and the public at large would be endangered. There-
fore, the drug company, which receives adverse reaction reports in the
normal course of treatment of the patient, should be permitted to assert
the physician-patient privilege to protect the privacy of the absent
patient.
Authorizing the drug company to assert the privilege would not
prevent the plaintiff from obtaining evidence necessary for the prosecu-
tion of his action. The court in Rudnick sought merely to protect the
patient from having his identity matched with his confidential medical
information. 165 Thus, unless the patient's identity would necessarily be
revealed thereby, a plaintiff would be entitled to discover the adverse
reaction reports, or abstracts from them, and the names of the submit-
ting physicians. This material would provide the plaintiff with the
information he requires as to the contraindications of the drug and the
company's notice of them. The usefulness of such information would not
be enhanced by the inclusion of the patients' names.
Plaintiff in Rudnick argued that discovery of the actual reports in
the possession of the drug company would prevent her from having to
bear the excessive burden of deposing physicians all over the United
States. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the patient's
164. As to the kind of warning drug companies must give, see Stevens v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 64-65, 507 P.2d 653, 661-62, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53-54
(1973).
165. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
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interest in privacy cutweighed the plaintiff's monetary interest.16  This
conclusion is consistent with the underlying policy of the privilege,
because each patient would have the choice to waive or assert the
privilege if his doctor were subpoenaed. Were this not the rule, neither
the patient nor the drug company's custodian of records would have the
means to maintain the confidentiality of the patient's medical data. It is
true that some patients may wish to testify on behalf of the plaintiff or
otherwise provide information. Nonetheless, such a waiver of privacy
should be within the discretion of the patient himself.
Conclusion
Rudnick v. Superior Court extended the coverage of the physician-
patient privilege by recognizing the ability of certain third parties to
assert the privilege on behalf of a nonparty patient whose medical
information is threatened with disclosure in the courtroom. This exten-
sion followed the apparent intent of the legislature and is warranted by
the threat to the patient's privacy presented by the existence of a rapidly
increasing number of third parties whose receipt of medical information
is "reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which the patient consulted [his] physician."
The full effect of this decision will not be known until further
litigation has defined the term "reasonably necessary" and thereby
identified those third parties who meet the Rudnick test. It is clear at
this point, however, that the decision in Rudnick has signicantly ad-
vanced the right of every individual to confidential medical treatment.
Although Rudnick allows third parties to assert the privilege, it places
no duty upon them to do so. It is hoped that the courts or the legislature
will now give this right some substance by requiring the third party to
assert the privilege on behalf of the patient, just as a physician is obliged
to do, and by requiring the courts to recognize the privilege. Only then
will the physician-patient privilege be a realiable and effective shield
against public disclosure in court of the physical ailments and deficien-
ciet of the absent patient.
Ralph W. Tarr*
166. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
* Member, Third Year Class
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